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New Public Management (NPM) reforms are intended to increase efficiency and support a more 
managerial approach to public problems. This paper examines how NPM-type reforms have led 
to the growing influence of finance and realestate departments in local level planning in 
Switzerland. Drawing on over 50 interviews, the paper maps the growing influence of flexible 
private-law or incentive-based instruments as complements to more binding instruments 
(typically zoning) in land-use planning practices. NPM reforms have prompted a renewed 
interest in public property, forcing municipalities to position themselves in relation to the 
necessity to sell or retain public land. The results show that NPM has affected practices of land-
use planning in Switzerland, but the outcomes are more complex than a one-to-one takeover and 
there is variation across the country. The Swiss case study helps extend the wider international 
debate about NPM and planning. This paper highlights the complex impacts of managerialism 
on planning reform as well as ongoing tensions between increased efficiency in plan 
implementation and public scrutiny. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing literature of planning calls for a shift from passive planning procedures toward more 
active alternatives (Hartmann & Spit, 2015; Healey & Barrett, 1985; Knoepfel et al., 2012; 
Krabben & Jacobs, 2013; Needham & Verhage, 1998; Weber et al. 2011). This shift to more 
“active land policy” implies for planners a need to better support the implementation of land-use 
plans (a method of intervention typical of Weberian bureaucracies) with other policy 
instruments, in particular incentives or public intervention in property rights. It is argued that 
the shift toward more active strategies is necessary because the context of planning has 
changed; less greenfield development and more redevelopment are needed (VLP-ASPAN, 
2013; Tillemans et al., 2012). Interestingly, this call for a more active approach to land-use 
planning parallels the “managerial turn” that has occurred in public administrations since the 
mid-1990s; the rationale of New Public Management (NPM) also leads to increased (cost-
)efficiency and to a more managerial approach to public problems (Mäntysalo et al., 2011; 
Sager & Sørensen, 2011).  
This article shows that in Switzerland proactive thinking in planning is not new; such 
approaches have been encouraged by the introduction of NPM in public administrations. This 
article analyzes the effect of NPM on the strategy of planners and explores connections between 
administrative reforms consistent with NPM and the active strategies used by municipalities to 
shape their spatial development. To what extent do the managerial practices promoted by NPM 
principles affect land-use planning practices? Did planners mobilize the readily available 
conceptual framework provided by NPM reforms to become more proactive?  
This explorative (semi-quantitative) survey investigates the strategies followed by 
Swiss municipalities to implement their development strategies. It leads to a reflective inquiry 
on the meaning of the adaptations that occurred in Swiss planning administrations following 
NPM reforms. We show that NPM has affected the practices of land-use planning in 
Switzerland, but that the outcomes are more complex than a one-to-one takeover. The 
conceptual framework of NPM is omnipresent, but local municipalities are not passive in the 
face of the managerial doxa and reinterpret it according to their needs. In the concluding part of 
this article, we build on these findings to draw conclusions concerning the present move toward 
active land policy that is occurring with the 2003 major revision of the Swiss Federal Land-use 
Planning Law (Hengstermann & Gerber, 2015). To that end, we build a typology of possible 
responses to NPM that shed light on the potentials and pitfalls of active land policy in 
Switzerland. 
  
2. New public management 
2.1. NPM paradigm 
Several studies on large-scale urban development projects show how the administrations of 
large cities have been influenced by neoliberal arguments concerning, in particular, public 
private partnerships (PPP) (Fainstein, 2008; Swyngedouw et al., 2002), which are also often 
advanced by the proponents of NPM. The NPM paradigm shares with neoliberal ideology a 
common faith in market-oriented management; for example, public administrations should 
model themselves on private firms (Dibben & Higgins, 2004; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). As the 
expression of an ideology, NPM imposes a particular approach to understanding public 
problems, to framing the mental interpretation of these problems and to imposing specific 
values. NPM also leads to the use of a specific set of practical tools, instruments, and methods 
that are supposed to provide an answer to the problems it has prompted actors to identify. 
Consequently, NPM has a dual nature; it is both a framework to interpret the world – which is 
referred to in this article as the NPM paradigm – and a set of tools and practices, which are the 
concrete manifestation of the NPM paradigm. 
Since the 1980s, the NPM paradigm has resulted in a shift from administration to 
management (Hughes, 2003). In connection with land-use planning, we appraise NPM as a 
comprehensive managerial approach (“managerial turn”) that aims to replace performance-
inhibiting control elements of the political-administrative system through management systems, 
structures and instruments inspired by the private sector. The main characteristic of 
administrations run according to NPM principles is that they advance the intended and 
measurable effects expected through public service provision rather than through available 
financial, personal and material resources (inputs). Public authorities all implement NPM 
principles differently, prioritizing one aspect or another depending on the problems to be solved, 
political majorities, or available experience.  
2.2. New public management in Swiss municipal administration 
The organization of the State in Switzerland is characterized by three executive levels: the more 
than 2300 political municipalities (local authorities), the 26 cantons and the Confederation. 
They work together in a form of “cooperative federalism”, i.e., “the completion of federal 
legislation by the cantons, the implementation of federal programs by cantonal and 
municipalities, and extensive finance – and revenue – sharing” (Linder, 1994, p. 55).  
A survey performed in the mid-2000s revealed that fewer than 5% of Swiss 
municipalities have officially introduced NPM in their administration (Steiner & Ladner, 2006). 
There is no boom of NPM in Switzerland at the local level. However, the percentage of 
municipalities using NPM methods increases proportionately with their size. The main reasons 
  
are that they are facing much more complex problems and that they have larger administrations 
and corresponding know-how (Steiner & Ladner, 2006). The authors of this study note that it 
would be wrong to underestimate the role of NPM. Many municipalities have achieved a series 
of reforms while moving toward NPM, e.g., definition of mission statements, separation of 
strategic and operative tasks, outsourcing of specific tasks, incentive wages, and abolishment of 
civil servant status. Although not all municipalities refer to NPM, many of them have achieved 
reform of their public management. Very often, NPM reforms are introduced only in selected 
departments of the administration. One can speak of a consolidation of public management 
practices involving elements of NPM rather than a booming expansion (Ritz, 2005; Steiner & 
Ladner, 2006). This mix of new types of management with Weberian bureaucracy result in what 
Pollitt and Bouckaert call “neo-Weberian public administration” (2011). The NPM paradigm 
always interferes with other variables such as the political culture or the political system. 
Although debates about NPM were virulent in the 1990s (Knoepfel et al., 1995), today, 
with the benefit of hindsight, the approach to NPM appears more pragmatic. It appears that 
Swiss municipalities have appropriated, reinterpreted, and made these ways of thinking theirs 
(Schedler, 2003). The challenge for the present study of cryptic but pervasive NPM-induced 
representations is to grasp new practices performed in the spirit of NPM but not necessarily 
labeled as such. 
2.3. NPM and Swiss land-use planning 
Different authors have analyzed and described the long-term transformations of land-use 
planning practices in Switzerland in connection with new forms of urban governance, such as 
the role of public-private partnerships and the urban economics of large urban developments 
(Theurillat  & Crevoisier, 2013; 2014), contemporary changes in specific urban planning 
instruments (Matthey, 2014; Schuler & Ruzicka-Rossier, 2011; Süess & Gmünder, 2005), 
contemporary socio-spatial reconfigurations linked with mobility (Söderström et al., 2012; 
Kaufmann & Faith Strelec, 2011), or challenges linked with densification (Scholl & Elgendy, 
2011). However, few analyses have focused on the changing use of policy instruments in 
planning (but see Ruegg, 2008; Weber et al., 2011).  
The present article builds on the last research strand and focuses on the reasons explaining these 
changes. An emerging trend in land-use planning research (e.g., in the context of the 
International Academic Association on Planning, Law, and Property Rights) claims that private-
law instruments (including property) such as those used by public actors must also be assessed 
to understand the full effect of planning practices (Knoepfel et al., 2012). Correspondingly, the 
influence of the NPM paradigm on spatial development will be addressed at the meeting point 
of the activities of planners, public real-estate managers and finance units who all address 
  
different policy instruments.  
Research question 1 
Municipalities are conceptualized as heterogeneous entities whose members (legislative, 
executive, city planners, public funds managers, and building managers) defend partially 
different interests but share the need to assert themselves in a competitive context in which their 
competences are challenged by private or public actors defending competing agendas 
(Hersperger et al., 2014). Often, the capacity of the political authority to govern depends less on 
electoral success and political majorities than on its capacity to cooperate with private/corporate 
actors, including landowners and developers, endowed with resources appropriate for 
undertaking urban development programs (Pierre, 1999; Stoker, 1995). To frame our 
exploration of the influence of the NPM paradigm on the spatial development strategies of 
municipalities, the first research question addressed in this article is, how do the NPM reforms 
modify the configuration of actors in charge of land-use planning at the local level? How are 
these actors – including finance units who are often simultaneously in charge of public real 
estate and budgetary efficiency – involved in decision-making about spatial development? 
Hypothesis 1: Effect of NPM reforms on the configuration of actors. The effect of 
reforms is characterized by a shift in the balance of power among actors, resulting in a greater 
importance given to the finance department, which is often in charge of public real estate, at the 
expense of planners. We expect NPM reforms to have a threefold consequence on the 
configuration of actors: (1) increased competition within and among municipalities for scarce 
resources, (2) increased importance of monetary considerations in land-use planning and 
strategic real-estate management, and (3) increased involvement of private actors (e.g., through 
public-private partnerships).  
Research question 2 
Public actors can rely on different policy instruments to implement their strategies. Policy 
instruments refer to, for example, regulation, education, information, market mechanisms, 
incentives, taxes, and public ownership. The selection of policy instruments is often presented 
functionally, as though the choice only depends on mere technical choices (Lascoumes & Le 
Galès, 2005, p. 11). However, instruments are not axiologically neutral; they are value loaded, 
correspond to a specific interpretation of the role of the state and/or its private partners, and 
denote a precise conception of intervention mechanisms (Salamon, 2002). Public policy 
instruments structure the social relationship between a public authority and the target groups 
according to the representations and meanings that they are carrying (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 
2005, p. 13). As such, the selection of policy instruments generates political activity. This 
  
allows us to formulate the second research question addressed in this article: – Considering that 
the NPM paradigm is expected to go together with a change in the range of mobilized policy 
instruments, will flexible private-law or incentive-based instruments be privileged at the 
expense of more binding instruments (typically zoning) in daily land-use planning practices? 
Which instruments stemming either from public or private law do municipalities use within the 
spatial development process?  
Hypothesis 2: Effect of NPM reforms on the range of mobilized policy instruments. We 
expect to observe a shift toward flexible instruments such as private-law and incentive-based 
instruments because they provide more freedom to the local administration and to 
private/corporate partners than does strict regulation. Conversely, the importance of binding 
plans and full public property will decrease. 
 
At this point, a word of caution is needed. It is important to acknowledge that NPM 
reforms are of course not the only parameter influencing strategies. The planning context is 
always changing, particularly because greenfield development is diminishing, and the pressure 
to redevelop existing neighborhoods or industrial brownfields is increasing. This article does not 
minimize the changes that occur independently of NPM reforms but argues that the NPM 
paradigm provides specific answers to the questions arising from the changing context. 
 
3. Policy instruments of land-use planning 
Governments, in general, and municipalities, in particular, use different tools or instruments to 
perform social control. “What government does to us – its subjects or citizens – is to try to 
shape our lives by applying a set of administrative tools, in many different combinations and 
contexts, to suit a variety of purposes” (Hood, 1983, p. 2). 
Following the classic, hierarchical Weberian model of administration that implies 
impersonality, concentration of administrative power and a leveling effect on social and 
economic differences (Weber, 1968), a hierarchical structure of plans regulating land use has 
evolved in Switzerland, a process orchestrated by the Federal Land-use Planning Law of 1979. 
Consequently, the supply of land is not simply a matter for the landowner; it is greatly 
influenced by municipalities that are in charge of delimiting building land from agricultural land 
through zoning and enacting building regulations.  
As in many other countries, municipalities grant development permits to landowners 
provided that their permit application conforms to zoning designations. Although plan making 
is proactive, providing a vision of local development for the next decades, plan implementation 
is reactive, as regulators await private development proposals and respond to them (Fulton, 
  
1999). Therefore, there is always a gap between the real supply of developable ‘parcels’  
(depending on the willingness of landowners to sell or to develop) and the potential supply 
(depending on land-use plans) (Davy, 2000). Once they have defined the potential supply of 
developable parcels, municipalities might develop strategies to address this gap. To be more 
proactive, a municipality can rely on several instruments to bring the practical supply of 
developable land to equal the potential supply such as that planned by land-use plans. We refer 
to all the means implemented by a municipality to match the real supply with the potential 
supply of parcels as an active land policy (Hartmann & Spit, 2015; Hengstermann & Gerber, 
2015). An active land policy refers to all public decisions and actions aiming to implement 
politically defined spatial development goals through changes in the use, distribution and value 
of land (Healey & Barrett, 1985; Krabben & Jacobs, 2013; Needham & Verhage, 1998).  
We examine three “families” of tools: (1) the different types of plans, (2) the framework 
affecting spatial development decisions (i.e., information and incentives), and (3) private law 
instruments. Public law involves the state using its authoritative power, including regulatory 
statutes, penal law and other laws of public order. It is distinguished from private law, which 
addresses relationships between individual or corporate actors (i.e., property law, the law of 
contracts, torts and obligations). In general terms, public law involves interactions between the 
state and the general population, whereas private law involves interactions between private 
actors. Governments can also establish a private relationship with private or corporate actors, 
which also falls within the definition of private law in this particular case. 
3.1. Types of plans 
Plans are the classical instruments of land-use planning (Bühlmann et al., 2011; Muggli, n.d.). 
Plans are the responses by public authorities to the problem of uncoordinated territorial 
development that might result from unrestrained property-title holders (Adams et al., 2002; 
Jacobs & Paulsen, 2009; Zimmerli, 1990). Fighting against uncoordinated spatial development 
leading to the loss of agricultural land, sprawl, and so forth, is the main goal of the Swiss 
national land-use planning policy and has not changed since the introduction of the Land-use 
Planning Law in 1979. We focus on two main dimensions of spatial plans in connection with 
NPM principles: their flexibility (i.e., their non-binding character to public actors) and the 
degree of involvement of private actors. 
In Switzerland, local zoning plans, which must comply with cantonal structure plans, 
are binding on land owners. The complete revision of local zoning plans is a lengthy process 
that occurs every fifteen years. To allow for more flexibility, some municipalities develop their 
own strategic plans, such as master plans. These plans can be a preliminary step toward a 
legally recognized plan (such as a municipal structure plan), they can become contractually 
  
binding as such if the different partners who took part in the elaboration of the plan sign it, or 
they can be used as guidelines in issues that are not covered by other plans. 
Comprehensive and local zoning plans are prepared by public authorities. However, 
private developers might be asked to prepare and fund design plans (district plans), particularly 
if public space is not the primary concern of the new development; in any case, the final 
validation of the plan is always done by a public authority.  
3.2. Framework conditions affecting decisions 
Municipalities can use different instruments to influence the actions of landowners and 
developers without formally constraining them; i.e., municipalities can provide incentives and 
information. This type of instrument is very much in line with NPM principles because it leaves 
private actors free to choose whether they want to behave according to the incentive.  
There are many types of incentives; however, not all of them are available to 
municipalities. For instance, municipalities have no room for maneuver to tax the activities that 
they do not want to happen; the cantonal authority is in charge of taxation. However, 
municipalities can financially encourage specific activities (e.g., renovation of representative 
buildings) if they develop a dedicated fund. 
Land deals are particularly opaque in Switzerland because there is no public statistical 
information about the price of transactions. Moreover, it is often difficult for a firm that is 
seeking to purchase land to know which landowners might be willing to sell. Consequently, to 
increase their attractiveness, some municipalities have developed a specialized service dedicated 
to providing this information and facilitating the installation of firms or private individuals. The 
facilitator helps to link potential new settlers, landowners seeking potential buyers and planning 
authorities in charge of permit deliverance.  
3.3. Private law instruments 
Land-use plans appear to be ever more challenged by instruments of private law, whose 
implementation is considered more flexible and efficient because it can be done partly outside 
of the political arena. Contractual agreements, public-private partnerships, and collaborations 
with other public actors result in a shift of responsibilities from the legislative to the executive. 
These transactions might be primarily treated as private and become partially opaque to public 
scrutiny (Morris, 2008). A re-scaling of the governance of land-use planning occurs (Cheever, 
1996; Wright & Czerniak, 2000). 
Property titles in general play an important role in shaping land use (Jacobs & Paulsen, 
2009). Land titles can be either used by public authorities to complement land-use planning or 
used by private/corporate actors to defend their own development agenda (Knoepfel et al., 2012; 
Nahrath, 2005).  
  
Many public actors were already using private law instruments before NPM reforms 
(Sieber, 1970; Zimmerli, 1990). Indeed, direct provision of services (e.g., through public real 
estate and corresponding servicing) fits well with pre-NPM practices (Leman, 2002). No one-to-
one relationship between NPM principles and the use of private law instruments can be 
established. However, we claim that although the instrument is the same, the reason for its use is 
different. Schematically, although the legitimation of public ownership was in essence seen in 
its ability to improve the provision of services to the public, under the NPM paradigm, public 
ownership is considered a means to circumvent direct public scrutiny to accelerate procedures.  
4. Methods 
4.1. Procedure followed in the analysis 
To highlight the effect of NPM reforms on the configuration of actors and to evaluate their 
choice of policy instruments to steer spatial development, a broad survey of nineteen Swiss 
municipalities was performed.  
To ensure comparability, the goal was to select municipalities sharing similar 
constraints. The typology of Swiss municipalities developed by the Swiss Federal Office of 
Statistics was used to produce a list gathering all of the municipalities belonging to the 
statistical types “center” or “suburban municipality” (Schuler et al., 2005). Suburban 
municipalities are located at the periurban fringes of a larger city. To narrow down the choice, 
municipalities described as “large centers” were removed from the sample (because their 
territory is totally urbanized). Smaller municipalities with a total population of less than 15,000 
inhabitants were also omitted (population size was used as a rough proxy for the size of the 
administration). Among the fifty-eight municipalities that fulfilled these criteria, nineteen were 
selected in the cantons to the north of the Alps (Table 1). 
In each municipality, city planners, public managers in charge of real-estate assets (including 
buildings), and political members of the executive were interviewed using a standardized 
question set and semi-directive face-to-face interviews (~60 min) to obtain a general picture of 
spatial development strategies. A total of 53 interviews (in four of them, one interviewee 
answered in the name of two administrative services) were conducted. After a preliminary phase 
addressing general organizational characteristics of the municipality (including the 
administration’s organization, the tasks of the different organs, and internal decision-making 
procedures), the interviews focused on two main issues: 
 Local effects of NPM reforms in the context of municipal spatial development (from t–
11990 to t02010). The effects of NPM reforms were evaluated according to three 
  
general trends that are at the core of the NPM paradigm: (1) increased competition for 
scarce resources, (2) increased pressure for financial efficiency, and (3) increased 
involvement of the private sector. 
 Changing use of policy instruments (between t–1 and t0). Three broad categories of 
instruments were discussed: (1) land-use planning instruments (plans), (2) framework 
conditions affecting spatial development (e.g., taxes and incentives) and (3) private-law 
instruments (e.g. property and contracts). 
The objective was to assess the role played by NPM reforms by understanding the reasons for 
the implementation of new strategies. For each question, interviewees were asked to decide on a 
scale of 1 to 5 whether the situation changed in comparison with the 1990s. Differences among 
the three categories of actors were analyzed using chi-square tests (Table 2).  
Because the questions raised in the questionnaire are often complex, the semi-
quantitative data produced in the questionnaire were always analyzed in connection with the 
reasons provided by the interviewees to explain their choices on the scale. These qualitative data 
provide explanations for and contexts in which given instruments are used. After discussing the 
hypotheses, we used these data to make an additional step in the analysis and build inductively a 
typology of the municipal responses to NPM reforms (Table 3). Ideal types are mental 
constructs resulting from a deliberate simplification and exaggeration of crucial aspects of the 
empirical reality (Weber, 1968). By stressing certain dimensions of the given phenomena 
common to several cases, ideal types provide standards to compare and interpret empirical data. 
The different ideal types are not mutually exclusive in the sense that a given municipality can 
present characteristics of different types.  
The selected cases provide a broad picture of suburban municipalities’ strategies. These 
municipalities are on the front line to manage growing urbanized areas. Their strategies are not 
representative of all Swiss municipalities but provide a good overview of the possible responses 
that a public actor can formulate when pressed to address spatial development issues.  
[Table 1] 
5. Results 
[Table 2] 
5.1. Effects of NPM reforms on the spatial development practices of municipalities 
Competition. Although financial resources have become scarcer, most interviewees agreed that 
competition for resources within municipalities has decreased. The fact that no significant 
differences of opinions were observed among the three categories of actors interviewed 
  
(politicians, planners and public real-estate managers) is a clear indicator that their shared 
perception of the problems results from a close coordination of their activities (Table 2). Two 
main factors explain this trend: administrative reforms tend to call for more output-oriented 
procedures, which often require different administrative units to collaborate (in our case, 
planning with finance departments). Simultaneously, increased competition among 
municipalities requires municipalities to muster their strength more efficiently. Large 
development initiatives are often triggered by external funding stemming from higher levels of 
government, in particular the Federal administration. Municipalities enter into new alliances 
with neighboring municipalities to meet the requirements of the financial backer (e.g., in the 
context of the “agglomeration policy” of the Swiss Confederation). Consequently, although 
overall competition among municipalities has increased because of scarcer financial resources, 
municipalities collaborate more closely with their direct neighbors because of the strong 
incentives provided by the Federal level. In line with the principles of NPM, these incentives are 
the result of a shift from a rather undifferentiated spreading of funds in regional development 
toward a more targeted form of project-oriented support.  
Financial efficiency and the management of real public assets. New standards for the 
presentation of financial statements (e.g., the IPSAS1-model) have been (or are in the process of 
being) introduced in most municipalities. These new rules, inspired by the private sector, press 
municipalities to evaluate their real assets at their market value, whereas, in the past, these 
assets used to disappear from the books after they had been amortized. In accordance with NPM 
precepts, these new accounting standards increase transparency (true cost, disappearance of 
hidden assets, cancellation of cross-financing), cost consciousness, and comparability 
(benchmarking). However, they also have “side effects” on public real estate; the main focus 
becomes the financial value of real estate instead of, for example, its “strategic” value (i.e., 
capacity to influence spatial development through property titles), option value, historical value, 
or amenity value. These accounting reforms lead to the monetization and commoditization of 
public real estate. Several interviewees signal an increased short-term interest in municipal real 
estate from politicians who think that its sale is the solution to pay off municipalities’ debts 
(e.g., municipality of Aarau in the 1980s and 1990s). The relationship between municipalities 
and their real assets reflect a complex reality with opposing trends. Some municipalities have 
only a minimal amount of real assets or have sold them all. Realizing that real assets are an 
important resource, these public actors are often willing to acquire strategic parcels for new 
development projects (e.g., municipality of Aarau in the 2000s or municipality of Carouge). In 
                                                 
1 IPSAS stands for International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
  
contrast, some municipalities own considerable amounts of real assets (e.g., municipalities of 
Biel/Bienne or Illnau-Effretikon). Facing important maintenance costs, these public actors are 
ready to sell the parcels which appear to be less important for their future development. Despite 
different specific situations, two trends emerge from the interviews: a renewed interest in public 
land acquisition as a means to influence development and an increasing pressure to optimize 
real asset portfolios (leading to sales and acquisitions). 
Public-private partnerships. Interviews reveal an ambiguous attitude toward PPP. Many 
municipalities have entered partnerships with private service providers, but few have done so in 
connection with spatial development issues. Although almost all authorities pretend to be open 
to PPP, which is in line with NPM precepts, there is a clear skepticism about the long-term 
effects of such partnerships (particularly concerning responsibilities if the private partner 
defaults or goes bankrupt). Ultimately, it appears that municipalities only enter PPP if they have 
no other choice, i.e., no possibilities to finance targeted development on their own. 
5.2. Evolution of practices in the selection of policy instruments in land-use planning 
‘Standard’ land-use planning instruments (public law). It appears that local land-use plans 
(zoning) and corresponding zoning ordinances remain fundamental tools of land-use planning; 
they are binding on landowners and exercise, as such, a major influence. In parallel to their need 
to establish a predictable framework through zoning, municipalities are confronted with 
planning tasks that are increasingly demanding and complex. In this context, the strategic 
dimension of structure plans is sought by many municipalities; they provide general guidelines 
to approach the complexity of today’s planning tasks. Flexible plans, such as masterplans, 
guidelines and other non-binding plans, also play an increasingly important role, either as 
internal guidelines for public authorities or as preliminary documents in the negotiations of 
more binding types of plans. Another trend revealed by the interviews is the rising importance 
of district plans, which is due to an increasing concern of municipalities for building quality; 
compulsory district plans allow for better control of development (for instance, when 
architectural contests are mandated). Overall, it appears that, since the 1990s, local zoning plans 
have been complemented by many other plans, each of which responds to specific needs. 
However, this increasing complexity in the use of planning instruments did not occur at the 
expense of land-use plans. Flexible instruments complement land-use plans but do not replace 
them. 
Interventions through the redefinition of framework conditions affecting decisions. Incentives, 
which make it possible for public authorities to avoid resorting to constraining measures such as 
  
bans or obligations, are gaining momentum, although they have not yet been widely introduced 
at the local level. Indeed, municipalities do not have the power to introduce new taxes. 
However, most of them have developed new funds to subsidize energy-saving measures or 
historic building preservation. A special type of incentives is the opportunity provided to 
newcomers to rely on the facilitating role played by dedicated public actors. The mayor 
coordinates the different services of the local administration to facilitate the settling down of 
companies or (mostly wealthy) inhabitants. Additionally, many municipalities have a dedicated 
person or service in charge of this task. However, the responsibilities, scope of intervention and 
mission of these services vary greatly. They are more developed in peripheral regions because 
of the special effort that is needed to attract companies or inhabitants (e.g., municipality of La 
Chaux-de-Fonds). In regions with rapid economic growth (e.g., municipality of Bulle), the 
challenge is to channel development rather than to attract potential newcomers. 
Intervention through private-law instruments. Although PPP remain uncommon, solutions 
tailored to the requirements of individual landowners or developers have become more 
widespread because target groups of land-use planning policies have become more demanding 
in discussing public decisions that might jeopardize their interests. In the same vein, public-
private arrangements concerning non-monetary compensation have increased. In negotiations 
concerning private district plans, private developers can ask for derogatory clauses to the zoning 
regulation in force (in particular concerning building density) if they comply with 
quality/technical standards or if they commit themselves to new developments that meet the 
public interest. Through this mechanism, municipalities can obtain specific improvements to the 
project (such as additional classrooms, social housing, energy-efficient buildings, or rooms for 
assistance to drug addicts) on private parcels. The main challenge of this type of instrument is 
for partners to author an agreement that satisfies both parties. The use of non-monetary 
compensation is by no means new; however, some municipalities have recently started to have 
higher expectations before granting derogatory measures. Municipalities who follow this 
strategy have found an economical means of gaining private participation in the execution of 
public infrastructure. However, plans specifically tailored to the requests of individual 
developers, including negotiated derogatory measures, raise the sensitive question of legal 
certainty and legal equality among citizens. 
Other important private-law instruments are long-term building leases. Building leases 
continue to be used extensively by those municipalities that have a long-term land policy (e.g., 
municipality of Biel/Bienne). Municipalities lacking this long tradition and experience tend to 
avoid building leases and prefer to sell their real assets. This trend is reinforced by the fact that 
the public real-asset management literature, which largely relies on standards borrowed from the 
private sector, does not expand on building leases, which require much fine-tuning to avoid bad 
  
surprises at their expiration. Consequently, despite their many advantages for public authorities 
(e.g., public control of property titles, fight against speculation, and regular income), the use of 
building leases is not increasing. 
For many public actors, public ownership appears to be the only solution to affect 
specific developments. Public actors are aware that land-use planning goals have no chance of 
being fulfilled in the face of well-protected private interests. To implement a more active land 
policy, public authorities might try to become landowners themselves. This strategy has a high 
financial cost. Some municipalities have created real asset acquisition funds, whereas others 
have special budget provisions for that purpose (e.g., municipality of Köniz). However, 
acquisitions are usually performed on a case by case basis. The performance of a municipality 
in the land market depends very much upon personal connections with landowners; because 
Swiss law does not provide public bodies a pre-emptive acquisition right in land deals and 
because financial details of land transactions are not public, the land market remains very 
opaque. Interviews reveal that giving oneself the means to enter this market (i.e., setting up a 
specialized administrative unit) is often the price to pay for a more active land policy. 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Discussion of the hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 is only partially confirmed. Overall, we observe more competition and 
benchmarking initiatives, increased concern for optimization and cost efficiency and intensified 
collaboration with the private sector. These changes are distinguishing features of NPM 
reforms. However, the effects of these reforms on actors are slightly different from our 
predictions. First, increased competition among municipalities appears to have encouraged 
cooperation within municipalities to promote competitiveness. Second, the increased 
importance of monetary considerations clearly gives a new role to finance and accounting 
specialists. However, this new role does not mean that finance departments take over real asset 
management. The effect of monetary considerations, and particularly of new accounting rules, is 
more subtle; public real estate tends to be evaluated according to its potential cash value rather 
than according to the strategic power and flexibility it might provide for the implementation of 
present and future spatial development decisions. Consequently, in many municipalities, land-
use planning services are required to  overcome a stronger resistance when they defend the 
formulation of land policies based on the acquisition of real estate. This “mixed feeling” toward 
public intervention through property titles has also been described in other countries (the case of 
the Netherlands is typical; Krabben & Jacobs, 2013). Third, although most municipalities claim 
to be open to PPP, in reality, few of them risk entering such contractual relationships with the 
private sector. PPP are also clearly perceived as a potential risk, which might weaken their 
  
position. Financial issues raised by PPP have also been described elsewhere in scientific 
discussions (e.g., Theurillat & Crevoisier, 2013, for the Swiss context). 
Hypothesis 2 is only partially confirmed. Overall, the importance of flexible 
instruments (non-binding plans, private plans, incentives, facilitation, PPP, and non-monetary 
compensation) clearly increases. Conversely, the importance of stricter instruments does not 
tend to decrease; local plans are as important as ever, binding structure plans become more 
relevant, and even the importance of public real assets increases. At first, these results might 
seem surprising. They can be explained by parallel trends that interviews clearly reveal:  
 A general need for more and better planning that considers the increasing complexity of 
spatial development calls for the use of a broader range of instruments, which is 
consistent with the international literature on active land policy.  
 Flexible plans, which tend to complement standard binding plans rather than replace 
them, are particularly needed to open the door to direct negotiation with target groups, 
leading the way to more binding plans in a second step. The complementary nature of 
binding plans and flexible (negotiated) plans is evident in connection with legitimacy; 
whereas the former are legitimized through compliance with democratic rules (primary 
legitimacy), the latter are legitimized through the outputs generated due to closer 
cooperation with target groups (secondary legitimacy such as promoted by NPM) 
(Mäntysalo et al., 2011).  
 The parallel development of private law instruments, which offers more room for 
maneuver to the executive and to the administration (at the expense of the legislative 
side), is actually a feature praised by the apologists for NPM. The greater importance 
given to public real estate must be understood in the light of the latter assertion; despite 
initial high acquisition cost and correspondingly heavy procedures, both of which 
contradict the slim state paradigm, public real estate is actually a tool that makes 
decision making concerning spatial development more flexible and more 
entrepreneurial (see typology below). 
6.2. New role for municipalities in spatial development 
By analyzing concrete policy instruments used by actors in charge of spatial development, this 
article reveals that public actors do not remain entirely without power or resource in the face of 
NPM reforms. Although under pressure to implement NPM, because its solutions impose 
themselves as self-evident in the context of the actual management and optimization-oriented 
doxa, municipalities are also under the influence of counter-movements and resistance 
strategies, a point that is particularly true in more urban settings in which these citizen 
initiatives are better established (Brenner, 2009; Eberlein, 1999; Harvey, 2008; Jessop, 2002; 
  
Larner, 2003; Whitehead, 2003). Consequently, it is not a surprise that interviews also reveal 
that municipalities do not implement NPM reforms passively but reinterpret its principles, adapt 
them to local specificities, or even distort them. As strategic actors, municipalities also use the 
new instruments promoted by NPM to defend their specific interests. Interviews reveal, in 
particular, that the spatial strategies of municipalities are influenced by development priorities 
resulting, for example, from the local socio-economic context, by how public actors legitimize 
their actions or by local traditions in connection with public intervention in the land market. 
These variables all influence how NPM reforms are implemented concretely. 
The above explains why the studied municipalities do not all follow the same strategies, 
set the same priorities or pursue the same goals. Relying on a qualitative analysis of the 
interviews, we constructed a typology of responses to NPM reforms in connection with land-use 
planning strategies (Table 3):  
 Laissez-faire strategy: This type of response to NPM is a one-to-one implementation of 
its principles. Because the NPM paradigm calls for a slimmer state through the 
redefinition of state action, a focus on operational missions, and the transfer of tasks to 
the private sector, those municipalities who maintain a low profile in land-use planning 
issues find a legitimation of their position in the principles of NPM. 
 Reinforcement strategy: This type of response to NPM results from the selection of 
NPM principles that can help municipalities to be more proactive in land-use planning. 
In particular, the efficiency of procedures is advanced. Private law instruments are 
promoted whenever they might be useful to reinforce state control over spatial 
development. NPM is considered an opportunity to question present practices and to 
develop new strategies of state intervention. 
 End-justifies-the-means strategy: The use of private law instruments, in particular 
public property or long-term leases, has a long history in some municipalities. The 
temptation is great among those public actors who own a great deal of land, including 
agricultural land, to play simultaneously on the zoning and property-title levels to 
maximize effects both on spatial development and profit. These municipalities tend to 
interpret NPM as a call to reinforce the executive at the expense of the local parliament. 
Municipalities that follow this strategy tend to behave as would any other private 
company in the land market and use public privileges as an asset they can take 
advantage of (Knoepfel et al., 2012). 
[Table 3] 
  
6.3. Outlook: The new Swiss land-use planning legislation 
Drawing conclusions concerning the changing context of land-use planning – implying less 
greenfield development and more redevelopment – a major revision of the Swiss Federal Land-
use Planning Law was passed in 2013 (in force since May 2014). In the first article of the law, 
the revision sets the tone; densification becomes a central goal of land-use planning. A new 
paragraph (in Art. 3) highlights the need to adopt measures guaranteeing better use of brown 
fields and unused areas located within building zones and to take advantage of densification 
opportunities. Through active land policy, local municipalities should become more proactive in 
the management of their spatial development. It is obviously too early to measure the effect of 
the new Land-use Planning Law on the strategies of planning authorities (local land-use plans 
are revised every fifteen years). However, the call for more active and managerial planning  
compels planners to question their role (Matthey 2015).  
What do the results of the present study mean in the light of the 2013 partial revision of 
the Federal Land-use Planning Law? The present study shows that NPM reforms do not 
undermine the devising of active land policies. Quite the opposite is true: local authorities are 
able to reinforce their position through a more managerial approach (“Reinforcement strategy”). 
However, the increased use of private-law instruments can also lead to more secrecy within 
local administrations because comparative advantages are lost when land-deal negotiations 
become public (“End-justifies-the-means strategy”). More active strategies linked with NPM 
reforms also tend to lead to day-to-day forms of management that might foster innovative 
solutions but privilege short-term benefits over long-term ones. The lessons to be drawn in 
connection with the 2013 legal revision and the expected shift toward more active land policy is 
that increased use of private-law instruments can indeed lead to greater involvement of public 
actors in spatial development, increased efficiency and more complex intervention strategies; 
however this needs to be done without the pitfall of a focus on short-term solutions, reduced 
democratic participation and narrowly-defined finance-centered objectives. Thus, the challenge 
for local administrations will be to become more active but without falling into the trap of 
shortsighted managerialism. 
7. Conclusion 
Our study reveals that, despite the laissez-faire strategy followed by some municipalities, NPM 
reforms have not led to a rollback of the local state (Brenner, 1998) in planning matters. This 
perpetuation or even reinforcement of the public sector is counterintuitive because NPM is 
supposed to call for a lean state but has been observed elsewhere (Guillén, 2001; Swank & 
Steinmo, 2002; Weiss, 1998).  
  
This study shows that many managerial practices promoted by NPM reforms have 
found an echo in planning practices. Direct causalities are difficult to demonstrate because no 
one-to-one takeover of NPM precepts can be identified. Some reforms are directly prompted by 
NPM principles, whereas some municipalities have used NPM as a source of inspiration in the 
quest for solutions to new challenges (such as densification, redevelopment of already built 
areas or the fight against land hoarding). Ultimately, the interactions between NPM reforms and 
land-use planning have had three main effects on daily planning practices. (1) They prompted a 
renewed interest in public property, forcing municipalities to position themselves in relation to 
the necessity to sell or keep it (or even to strategically acquire more of it). (2) Because 
efficiency became central, municipalities were compelled to develop more elaborated 
development strategies. (3) Together with the emergence of new planning challenges, land-use 
planning instruments are increasingly considered together with other instruments such as 
incentives and public real estate. 
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Table 1. List of selected municipalities. Source: Swiss Federal Office of Statistics 
Municipality Canton French/German-
speaking 
Total population Surface (ha) 
Aarau Aargau G 15753 1233 
Muttenz Basel-Land G 17119 1664 
Biel/Bienne Bern F/G 50013 2123 
Köniz Bern G 37974 5101 
Bulle Fribourg F 17494 2387 
Carouge Geneva F 19721 270 
Meyrin Geneva F 20329 994 
Kriens Lucerne G 25893 2734 
La Chaux-de-Fonds Neuchâtel F 37240 5566 
Neuchâtel Neuchâtel F 32592 1810 
Freienbach Schwyz G 15681 1378 
Solothurn Solothurn G 15623 628 
Wil St. Gallen G 17678 762 
Frauenfeld Thurgau G 22665 2737 
Monthey Valais F 16302 2863 
Renens Vaud F 18982 296 
Morges Vaud F 14615 385 
Illnau-Effretikon Zurich G 15338 2529 
Thalwil Zurich G 16631 550 
 
  
  
Table 2. Data summarizing interviews performed in the nineteen local authorities. For each 
indicator, interviewees were asked to decide on a scale of 5 (reduced to 3 in the table) whether 
the situation had changed in comparison with the 1990s. For each question, the answer 
supported by a majority of interviewees is highlighted in bold. The total number of answers is 
the sum of all interviews performed in all nineteen municipalities. Chi-square tests indicate no 
significant differences of opinions between the three categories of actors interviewed 
(politicians, planners and public real-estate managers). Their answers are therefore presented in 
an aggregated form. A number smaller than the total number of interviews (53) indicates that 
some interviewees did not respond to the question.  
 Total # of 
answers 
Growing 
trend (%) 
Stable 
trend (%) 
Decreasing 
trend (%) 
NPM reforms in connection with land-use 
planning practices 
    
1. Increased competition (today in comparison with 
1990)? 
    
– Competition among administrative services 50 10 (20%) 15 (30%) 25 (50%) 
– Competition among local authorities 50 30 (60%) 11 (22%) 9 (18%) 
2. Increased link between financial considerations 
and real-estate management? 
    
– Accounting rules for public real estate aiming to 
increase transparency and cost consciousness 
32 25 (78.1%) 7 (21.9%) 0 
– Profitability objectives for public real estate 44 22 (50%) 20 (45.5%) 2 (4.5%) 
– Pressure to sell public real estate 50 13 (26%) 19 (38%) 18 (36%) 
3. Increased number of public-private 
partnerships? 
    
– Implementation of projects together with private 
partners (incl. public-private partnership) 
52 34 (65.4%) 16 (30.8%) 2 (3.8%) 
– Outsourcing of public tasks to the private sector 49 13 (26.5%) 31 (63.3%) 5 (10.2%) 
 
Evolution of practices in land-use 
planning 
    
1. Increased use of statutory interventions?     
– Structure plans (“Richtplan”, “plan directeur”) 
(binding) 
41 29 (70.7%) 11 (26.8%) 1 (2.4%) 
– Local zoning plans 39 12 (30.8%) 27 (69.2%) 0 
– Masterplan, guidelines (non-binding) 36 26 (72.2%) 9 (25%) 1 (2.8%) 
– Private district plans 36 24 (66.7%) 10 (27.8%) 2 (5.6%) 
2. Trend toward improvement of general 
framework conditions? 
    
– Inciting instruments (taxes, subsides, incentives) 44 24 (54.5%) 19 (43.2%) 1 (2.3%) 
– Role as a facilitator 45 28 (62.2%) 17 (37.8%) 0 
3. Increased intervention through private law?     
– Public-private partnership, contract, convention 46 32 (69.6%) 14 (30.4%) 0 
– Non-monetary compensation 35 20 (57.1%) 15 (42.9%) 0 
– Long-term building leases 45 13 (28.9%) 21 (46.7%) 11 (24.4%) 
– Public real estate used to steer development 45 26 (57.8%) 18 (40%) 1 (2.2%) 
  
  
  
Table 3. Typology of the strategies implemented by local authorities in response to NPM 
reforms. Ideal types are interpretations of the empirical data; they are mental constructs 
resulting from a deliberate simplification and exaggeration of crucial aspects of the empirical 
reality. As heuristic devices to be used to discuss the empirical reality, the three ideal types 
presented below show that NPM can lead to different outcomes at the local level depending on 
the priorities of the political-administrative actors. NPM can lead to a reinforcement of actors in 
charge of planning (“reinforcement strategy”). However, it can also lead to minimal public 
intervention (“Laissez-faire strategy”) or to a reinforcement of land deals and other private-law 
interventions whose context tends to escape public scrutiny (“end-justifies-the-means strategy”). 
 Laissez-faire strategy Reinforcement strategy End-justifies-the-means 
strategy 
Characteristics of NPM 
reforms 
NPM leads to small state 
and correspondingly 
minimal intervention in 
planning issues 
NPM leads to a 
reinforcement of the 
planning action through 
the increased array of 
tools available 
NPM leads to a 
reinforcement of the 
executive through the 
import of private sector 
practices. Local authority 
behaves as would any 
other private company 
Public law instruments Minimal  Standard tools + all the 
other participatory plans 
Standard tools + private 
plans 
Private law instruments Sale of public assets; PPP Private law used to 
reinforce public law 
through targeted action 
(e.g., acquisition of 
strategic parcels) 
Private law used to 
circumvent public law 
and increase efficiency 
(reinforcement of the 
executive at the expense 
of the legislative) 
Expected effects on 
spatial development 
No willingness to thwart 
unsustainable 
development trends 
through specific public 
intervention 
Social and environmental 
sustainability goals 
Economic sustainability 
goals 
Development priorities Management of self-
sustained growth 
Redevelopment of 
(partially) built areas  
Need to boost declining 
local economy 
Political legitimacy Free-market oriented Political support through 
democratic legitimacy 
(primary legitimacy) 
Consensus through 
appreciation of outputs 
(secondary legitimacy) 
Bureaucratic traditions No consensus concerning 
the acquisition of public 
land  
Well-established process 
of acquiring public 
parcels to increase stock 
Consensus concerning 
public intervention 
through acquisition; stock 
of public parcels available 
 
 
